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DEFINING THE ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIP APPROPRIATE FOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAININGt
MICHAEL C. HARPER*

These are, of course, difficult times for those who share the goals
of the framers of the original National Labor Relations Act (the
"NLRA" or "Act") .'
As union density in the private sector has continued
to decline2 and as the NLRA has proven helpless against the economic
developments that have generated continuing employer resistance to
collective bargaining, the original vision of the Wagner Congress must
seem myopic and shaded with an excessively optimistic tint. Observing
these economic developments and the enhanced impediments to union organization that they have posed makes it clear that only a much
different statute could achieve the Act's original goals. It is equally
clear that the current Congress has little interest, and little cause for
interest, in such a statute or, for that matter, in any goals of the Act
that extend beyond providing legitimacy and stability to our industrial
system.
Nevertheless, economic and political winds may yet shift. Those
who continue to believe that collective bargaining should have a central role in our modern capitalist economy may yet fruitfully inquire
t Copyright © 1998 by Michael C. Harper. This article was presented to the Fiftieth Annual
New York University Conference on Labor and will be published again in a volume of the
proceedings of that conference.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I thank both Sandrt K. Davis and
Michele L. Booth for research assistance.
'The National Labor Relations Act ("NLA"), enacted in 1935 and amended several times
since, is currently codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1994).
2The latest Employment and Earnings Report from the United States Department of Labor
indicates that unions represented 11.2% of employed private nonagricultural wage and salary
workers in 1996. See U.S. DEP'T or LAB., EMPLOyMiENT AND EARNrNGs 213 (1997). Union membership itself was down to 10.2% of employed private nonagricultrural wage and salary workers.
See id. Forty years ago, union members constituted about one out of every three employed private
nonagricultural wage and salary workers. See MICHAEL C. HARPER & SAM-iUEL ESTREICHER, LABOR
LAW 108-09 tbl.1, 111 tbl.3 (1996).
3 See generally, e.g., MICHAEL COLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES (1987); ThomAs A. KocmN ET AL., THE TRANSFORmATION OF AmERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS

ch. 3 (2d ed. 1994); Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in

the Face of Union OrganizingDrives, 43 LNDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 351 (1990); Paul C. Weler,
Promises To Keep: Securing Workers'Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv.
1769 (1983).
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how government regulation might attempt to achieve that role. In this
essay, I will contribute to that inquiry. I will do so not by attempting
an analysis of the causes of union decline or by presenting a comprehensive regulatory framework that might be sufficient to arrest that
decline and achieve the goals of the original Act. More modestly, I will
focus on how the Act, as currently formulated and interpreted, cannot
adequately respond to one particular set of economic arrangements
that has offered employers inviting routes to evade collective bargaining and the basic compromise between capital and labor that the Act
4
provides.
My focus will be on peripheral or segmented employment arrangements. These include the structuring of economic relationships
to treat workers as independent contractors not covered by the Act's
definition of employee and the leasing of employees from employment
agencies that retain sufficient direct control over the work of the
employees to be classified as the employees' sole, or at least joint,
employer. Perhaps most importantly, they include a firm's subcontracting of work necessary to make its capital productive to independent
firms, which are treated as the workers' sole employers.
I.

THE

NLRA's

CENTRAL COMPROMISE

Had it not been concerned with economically disruptive "strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest,"5 Congress probably
would not have passed the National Labor Relations Act.6 The Act's
legislative history, however, as well as its express statement of policy,
reflect a substantive goal that extends beyond the redirection of worker
discontent into a structured process that labor leaders as well as the
rank and file could accept as legitimate. 7 Congress intended the NLRA
to increase real "wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners
in industry. '8 It would do so by righting the "inequality of bargaining
power between employees.., and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association." 9 The assumption
4 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158.
5

1d. § 151.

6 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, at 1-2 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIIE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935 2300-01 (1985) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY);

H.R. REP. No. 969, at 6 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 2916.
7 See infra notes 8-10. For an argument that the NLRA was intended to inspire as well as
pacify workers, see Mark Barenberg, The PoliticalEconomy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation,106 HARV. L. REv. 1379, 1441-42 (1993).
8 29 U.S.C. § 151.
9

Jd.
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was that bargaining collectively with such employers would result in
higher wages than bargaining individually.10 This assumption is understandable because a collective employee withdrawal of labor that is
necessary to make particular capital productive has more impact than
the refusal of an individual employee to work.
One of the substantive goals of the NLRA was thus to increase the
returns of labor. The Act and its legislative history did not specify the
source of these enhanced returns, but simple economic theory makes
clear that this source must be some combination of an enlargement of
the joint returns of labor and the capital it makes productive, and of
an increase in the labor share of these joint returns. The NLRA,
therefore, was framed to allow workers to join together in an attempt
to increase their wages through collective bargaining with the parties
who are the primary beneficiaries of their work, namely the providers
of the capital that their labor helps make productive."' Only such
capital providers have both the potential interest and the potential
ability to offer enhanced wages.
The Act, however, expresses a compromise with the realities of
capital mobility in a competitive market economy. The Act neither
guarantees union-represented employees any particular wage rate nor
does it require the providers of capital to agree to any particular wage
enhancement demands of unions.1 2 Employers only must bargain in
good faith over wages and working conditions with collective representatives chosen by their employees; they need not agree to accept
any particular bargaining proposals. 3 Presumably, under the threat of
10See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, at 3, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote 6, at 2302;
78 CoNG. REc. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner). See also Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of
the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMi L. REv. 285,
291-92, 319-20 (1987).
1 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158.
12 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, at 3, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 2302,
2312 ("[T]he duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement,
because the essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide whether
proposals made to it are satisfactory.").
IIn NLRB v. American NationalInsurance Co., the Supreme Court said:
The insertion of section 8(5) [codified as 29 U.S.C. § 158(5), which makes it an
unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively] was described by the Senate
Committee as follows:
'The committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that this bill is
designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit governmental supervision of their terms....
"But, after deliberation, the committee has concluded that this fifth unfair labor
practice should be inserted in the bill.... [A] guarantee of the right of employees
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing is a mere
delusion if it is not accompanied by the correlative duty on the part of the other
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a collective withdrawal of employees from work, employers will agree
to share both enhanced returns caused by union-induced increases in
productivity 4 and any extraordinary returns that may derive from some
product market monopoly or some locational product or input market
advantage.'- Nevertheless, where workers demand a share of the minimum profit that their providers of capital demand as a condition for
maintaining this use for their capital, the workers risk the loss of their
jobs through the withdrawal of the capital.
Thus, just as the Act protects the choice of employees to engage
in collective bargaining through the leverage of joint withdrawals of
labor, it allows employers to resist this leverage through the withdrawal
of capital. This is the basic compromise of the Act. Both labor and
capital remain free to withdraw their contributions to joint production
when the other side demands an excessive proportion of the returns
of that production.
This compromise has been elaborated further in ways that protect
the bargaining position of the providers of capital. For instance, where
good faith bargaining on how to divide the joint returns from the
combination of labor and capital results in an impasse, the provider of
the capital may set the division unilaterally and move forward with
production on those terms. 16 Furthermore, under a doctrine that consistently (though not without controversy) 17 has been applied since the

party to recognize such representatives as they have been designated... and to
negotiate with them in a bona fide effort to arrive at a collective bargaining
agreement."
343 U.S. 395, 403 n.10 (1952) (citing S. RE'. No. 573, at 12, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTOR ,
supra note 6, at 2312).
14 See generallyKenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, BargainingAnalysis of Amen can LaborLaw and the
Searchfor BargainingEquity and Industrial Peace, 91 Mimi. L. REv. 419, 431-34 (1992). For
empirical studies showing the significant positive effect of unions on productivity, see, e.g.,
RicHARD B. FREiAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 166 (1984); Dale Belman,
Unions, the Quality of LaborRelations, andFirmPerformance,in UNioNS AND EcoNoMzzc Co.NsrETITIVENESs 46-55 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds. 1992); Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett
Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND EcoNoN11c
CoM'PE-rrrvE'ss, supra,at 247, 269. But see generallyJohn T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union
Effects on Productivity, Profits and Growth: Has the LongRun Arrived, 7J. LAB. EcoN. 72 (1989).
Is See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 14, at 419, 431-34.
16 See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198, 200 (1991) (affirming that
employer can effect a unilateral change only after it bargains to impasse); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 745, 747-48 (1962) (indicating that after an impasse is reached, the employer may set a new
wage level that is not greater than any level it offered at the bargaining table).
17 See, e.g., S. 55, 103d Cong. (1993) (unenacted bill that would have made it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to replace a striking worker permanently but would still allow the hiring
of temporary workers during strikes); Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 ILL. L. REV.
817, 831-32 (1941).
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early days of the Act, the providers of capital may continue production
with other workers where incumbent employees have collectively withdrawn their labor. 8 This doctrine, like the unrestrained discretion of
employers to withdraw capital, limits employees' capacity to free themselves from the pressures of competitive labor markets. 19
Given the basic compromise of the Act, and its more particular
elaborations, collective bargaining can promise only'limited redistributive effects and should not threaten the efficient allocation of capital.
Nonetheless, a half century of experience under the Act has demonstrated that the managers of capital are sensitive to any reduction of
returns and will look for any available routes to escape collective
bargaining obligations that threaten the maximization of profits. Some
of these routes have been made available by congressional, administrative and judicial elaborations of the original NLRA. Some clearly upset
the basic compromise of the Act and disserve its limited redistributive
goals.
II.

CAPITAL AND THE DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE UNDER THE

NLRA

Consider first how the Act, as interpreted and reformulated by the
Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947,10 allows a firm to exclude from
collective bargaining protection workers who make its capital productive, but who do not require (and perhaps cannot be given) close direct
supervision or control. A worker must achieve the status of an "employee" to be protected by the NLRA, and the Act's definition of
"$employee" expressly excludes "any individual having the status of an
independent contractor."21 This exclusion was added by the Taft-Hartley Act in 194722 in response to the United States Supreme Court's
decision three years earlier in NLRB v. HearstPublications,Inc., which
interpreted the Act's definition of employee "in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained."2 3 The Hearst Court
upheld the National Labor Relations Board's (the "Board's") finding
of employee status for "newsboys" who distributed papers on city
streets, aided by "sales equipment and advertising materials ... fur18See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
19See generally Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargainingor "Collective Begging"?: Reflections on
AntistrikebreakerLegislation, 93 MICH. L. REv.577 (1994).
20 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1994)).
2129 U.S.C. § 152(3).
22See Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.
2322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (quoting South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S.
251, 259 (1940)).
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nished by the publishers," who also dictated "their buying and selling
prices,.. . their markets and... their supply of papers."24 Stressing
that the "newsboys" were "merchants who bought newspapers from the
publisher and hired people to sell them," the House Report condemned the Hearstdecision and explained that the "independent contractor" exclusion was added to insure that the common law distinction between employee and independent contractor would be
maintained.2 In 1968, in NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the congressional intent for the Board
and courts to "apply general agency principles in distinguishing be2
tween employees and independent contractors under the Act." 6
The common law distinction between employees and independent contractors, applied by the Board since the Taft-Hartley
amendment and approved by the Court in United Insurance turns on
whether "the purported employer controls or has the right to control
both the result to be accomplished and the 'manner and means' by
which the purported employee brings about that result."2 The distinction was developed as a principle of tort law to determine whether a
firm has vicarious liability for the wrongs committed by those who may
be advancing the firm's interests. 2 8 For this purpose, it is a rational
doctrine. A firm that surrenders the right to control how work is
performed is not in the best position to insure that an appropriate
level of care is taken to avoid wrongs.2 9 Imposing liability on a firm that
has decided that its control over particular work is not efficient could
induce the firm to engage in an inefficient level of monitoring. 0 The
common law right-to-control test thus can be explained as a means to
determine which party should be responsible for setting the level of
precaution. 31
As a test for determining which workers should be able to bargain
collectively with a firm whose interests they advance, however, it makes
no sense at all. It means that any workers whose "manner and means"
24

d. at 131.
2 See H.R. REP. No. 245, at 18 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEmENT

RFLATiONS ACT OF 1947 309 (1948) [hereinafter 1 LEG. HIST. OF TIE

LMRA].
26390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).

27
28

2

Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1982).
See RESTATM ENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).

9See, e.g., Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 938-39 (7th Cir. 1986).

30 See Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 E2d 1529,1544 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) (noting, however, that if both parties were solvent and could contract at no cost
over the allocation of damages, no extra monitoring would be induced).
31 See generallyAlan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicaious Liability, 93 YALE Lj. 1231 (1984).
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of work are not under the direct control of the firm that compensates
them cannot bargain collectively with that firm, regardless of either
the importance of their labor to the productivity of the firm's capital
or the lack of any individual bargaining leverage possessed by the
workers. 32 It allows employers, by a little extra delegation of authority
and careful structuring of compensation, to exclude from the Act's
coverage workers, such as traveling sales personnel, delivery drivers
and taxicab drivers, whose mobility makes direct supervision infeasible.33 For example, puiblishers can exclude newspaper deliverers from
the Act's coverage merely by giving the deliverers control over their
own routes and the ability to hire and fire assistants.3 4 The right-to-control test does not seem to care that the deliverers add value to the
publisher's capital investments in production and marketing. Nor does
it care that the deliverers make no significant capital investments
themselves and have no other means to negotiate a different level of
compensation from that set by the publishers through control over the
newspapers' price and the number of copies transferred to each distributor.
Admittedly, the common law right-to-control test need not be so
rigidly applied. Although a number of lower courts have resisted any
tendencies of the Board to look beyond the alleged employer's direct
control over the "manner and means" of the work and consider other
factors that are more concerned with the actual economic position of
the workers, 35 the Supreme Court has suggested that the common law
test is flexible and requires consideration of all factors of the workers'
32See Hilton Int'l Co., 690 F.2d at 320.
3
5Hence, work arrangements such as these have generated most of the independent contractor cases under the NLRA. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 187
(1973) (driver-salesmen); NLRB v. Ohare-Midway Limousine Serv., Inc., 924 F.2d 692, 694 (7th
Cir. 1991) (limousine drivers); Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(lessee cab drivers). But cf. Aurora Packing Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 73, 75-76 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(finding rabbinical ritual slaughterers to be independent contractors because the religious work
was necessarily performed without the supervision of the kosher meat company).
34See, e.g., American Publ'g Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 563 (1992).
35
See, e.g., C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (extent of "actual
supervision" over "the means and manner" of work is most important element); North Am. Van
Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (other factors "are probative only to the
extent that they bear upon and further" inquiry into control over "manner and means of the
details of the worker's performance"); Yellow Taxi Co., 721 F.2d at 382 n.37 (listing 12 court
decisions rejecting Board determinations that workers were employees under the Act). But see,
e.g., Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (asserting, in an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act case, that an "individual's economic dependence upon the hiring party may be
taken into account under the common law agency test"); NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 651
F.2d 57, 63 (1st Cir. 1981) (upholding Board's finding of employee status based on multifactor
inquiry, including consideration of the extent of "entrepreneurial independence").
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relationship with the alleged employer. In United Insurance,for example, the Court upheld the Board's holding that an insurance company's debit agents, who primarily collected premiums, prevented lapsing of policies and sold new insurance, were employees. 6 The Court
found the decisive factors to be:
[T]he agents do not operate their own independent businesses, but perform functions that are an essential part of the
company's normal operations; they need not have any prior
training or experience, but are trained by company supervisory personnel; they do business in the company's name with
considerable assistance and guidance from the company and
its managerial personnel and ordinarily sell only the company's policies; the "Agent's Commission Plan" that contains
the terms and conditions under which they operate is promulgated and changed unilaterally by the company; the agents
account to the company for the funds they collect under an
elaborate and regular reporting procedure; the agents receive the benefits of the company's vacation plan and group
insurance and pension fund; and the agents have a permanent working arrangement with the company under which
they may continue as long as their performance is satisfac37

tory

Two or three of these factors are relevant to the degree of the
company's control over the agents' work; some, such as being an
"essential part of the company's normal operations," seem not to
be.
In its most recent discussion of the common law distinction between employees and independent contractors, the Court not only
repeated its admonition in United Insurance that "all of the incidents
of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor
being decisive," 8 but also repeated a prior summary of the common
law test, which included as relevant not only the "right-to-control," but
also:
the source of instrumentalities and tools; the location of the
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;'
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
36 See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 255, 260 (1968).
37
1d. at 258-59.
3
SNationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (quoting United Ins., 390
U.S. at 256).
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discretion over when and how long to work; the method of
payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision
of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired
39

party.

Again, a number of these factors, such as "the source of instrumentalities and tools," do not seem at all relevant to the right-to-control
question, yet may be relevant to whether the workers and the "hiring party" fit within the purposes of the Act for encouraging collective bargaining. 40 Thus, at the very least, the Court's decisions provide support for the Board's continued application of a flexible,
multifactor test that includes consideration of workers' capital in41
vestments.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's (and the Board's) more flexible approach to the common law employee-independent contractor
distinction does not render that distinction an acceptable test for
determining the Act's coverage. The very flexibility of the approach,
as reflected in the range of factors that it encompasses, makes it either
unpredictable for both employers and unions or manipulable by employers who can control most of the factors without changing basic
economic relationships, or both. For example, recent publicized litigation before the Board involving Roadway Package System 42 and Dial-AMattress Operating Corporation 43 illustrates how firms, cognizant of
the multifactor tests suggested by the Court and the Board, may at39

1d. at 323-24 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52
(1989)).
40
See id. at 324. Indeed, the Court in Darden suggested that the common law test might
incorporate even additional factors by citing, under a "Cf."
signal, both the REsTATmFNr (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) and Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298-99. See id.Both the
Restatement and the Revenue Ruling include additional factors that were not directly listed by
the Court. See RESTATEMrNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220(2); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296,
298-99. Some of these factors, such as "whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business" and whether the worker lacks a major investment in the facilities used
to perform the services, could justify the Board covering workers whose economic relationships
are appropriate for collective bargaining. See RESTATEMNENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2).
41 See, e.g., Diamond L Transp., Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 630, 631 (1993) (exposure to entrepreneurial risk); Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 614, 616 (1991) (proprietary
interest in delivery route); Don Bass Trucking, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1174 (1985) (capital
investment in trucks).
42
Roadway Package Sys., Inc., NLRB, Nos. 31-RC-7267, 31-RC-7277 (petition filed Mar. 9,
1995). This case involves drivers operating out of two terminals owned and operated by a company
that contracts with customers to deliver packages. See id.
43
Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., NLRB, No. 29-RC-8442 (petition filed Feb. 24, 1995).
This case concerns drivers who deliver mattresses for a particular retailer. See id.
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tempt to structure their economic relationships with delivery drivers
without changing the drivers' ultimate dependence on the capital
provided by the firms. Arguments advanced in the briefs in these cases
also demonstrate the elasticity of a multifactor analysis that is not
44
grounded in any ultimate policy goal.

Making any flexible approach more predictable and less manipulable requires subordinating all factors to some principle or policy. The
common law, however, only provides an inapplicable principle for
assigning responsibility for taking precautions to prevent harms to
third parties. 4 In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,0 the
government argued in an amicus brief that the Court should interpret
Congress's unelaborated use of the word "employee" under a modified
common law test, weighing the common law factors differently de47
pending on the purposes of the particular statute being interpreted.
The Court in Darden, however, rejected this position, holding that
unless Congress specifies otherwise, "traditional agency law principles"48 should be incorporated into any statute using the word employee, without regard to "the mischief to be corrected and the end to
49
be attained."
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations ("Dunlop Commission") recommends the replacement of "the ancient doctrine of master and
servant" for all federal employment and labor statutes. 0 In its place,

44 See, e.g., Brief for Roadway Package Sys., Inc. at 8-32, Roadway Package Sys., Inc., NLRB,
No. 31-RC-7277; Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Dial-A-Mattrcss at 5-14, Dial-A-Mattress Corp,
NLRB, No. 29-RC-8442. For instance, in Dial-A-Mattress, the firm's attorneys stressed such factors
as the drivers' acknowledgement of an independent contractor status in contracts they had to
sign to continue delivering mattresses, the drivers' printing of business cards, the fact that
Dial-A-Mattress pays drivers for putting the firm's advertising on their delivery vehicles, the fact
that Dial-A-Mattress does not require drivers to select any particular type of delivery vchiclc, the
fact that Dial-A-Mattress pays only for deliveries actually made, and many other factors, the
relevance of which to any ultimate policy consideration is not clear. See Brief in Support of
Dial-A-Mattress's Request for Review Before NLRB at 16-45, Dial-A-Mattrcss Corp, NLRB, No.
29-RC-8442.
45 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 220.

46503 U.S. 318, 318 (1992).
47
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11-21, Nationwidc
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (No. 90-1802), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs (Congressional Info. Serv.).
4
8 See 503 U.S. at 323, 328.
49
1d. at 324-25 (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 US. 704, 713 (1947) (quoting NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944))). The Court in Darden interpreted the use
of the word "employee" in the Employee Retirement Income SecurityAct but implicitly confirmed
the holding
in United Insurancefor the NLRA. See 503 U.S. at 322-25.
50
CONSfISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOM-

MENDATIONS

38 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter

DUNLOP CO.NZIISSION].
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the Dunlop Commission recommends an alternative test for all federal
statutes that turns "on the underlying economic realities of the relationship."'51 Although an improvement for the NLRA, the proposed test
would suffer from some of the same problems that impair the common
law agency test.
Based on a 1947 Supreme Court decision that Congress did not
reject, the federal courts have interpreted the definition of employee
in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) under what they term an
"economic realities" test 5 2 In Darden,stressing the FLSA's definition of
"employ" to mean "suffer or permit to work,"55 the Court again confirmed this test for the FLSA and its coverage of "some parties who might
not qualify . . .under a strict application of traditional agency law
principles."54 Under the economic realities test, however, as under the
common law agency test, the courts have weighed a range of factors
without indicating that any one factor should be controlling.5 5 The
factors most often considered include: (1) permanency of the working
relationship; (2) opportunity for profit or loss; (3) investment in material or equipment; (4) degree of control over work; (5) individual
skill; and (6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the
company's business.5 6 Clearly, analysis of these factors could point in
opposite directions in the same case, such as where skilled nurses
perform minimally-supervised, temporary home-care work through a
number of employment agencies, each of which pay the nurses an
hourly wage out of the reimbursement the agencies collect from the
57
patients.
Again, what is needed to insure the predictability of this multifactor test, like that of any multifactor legal test, is some ultimate standard
by which to weigh the factors. Some courts have suggested that the
ultimate concern of the economic realities test is whether the workers
depend "upon someone else's business for the opportunity to render
51

Id.

52See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947); see also Goldberg v.
Whitaker, 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1983). The
test seems to have originated in the Court of Appeals decision upheld in Rutherford Food Corp.
SeeWalling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1946).
5329 U.S.C. § 203(e) (g) (1994).
54
Darden, 503 U.S. at 326.
55
See, e.g., Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that
"[s]ince the test concerns the totality of circumstances, any relevant evidence may be considered,
and mechanical
application of the test is to be avoided.").
5
6 See, e.g., Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1989); Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg.,
Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985); Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 E2d 141, 143 (5th Cir.1981)
(considering first five factors only).
57
See SuperiorCare, 840 F.2d at 1057 (finding the nurses to be employees under similar facts).
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services or are in business for themselves. 58 The Dunlop Commission,
although it suggests factors other than the five or six most often used
by the courts in FLSA cases, 9 picks up this same theme, asserting that
"[w]orkers who are economically dependent on the entity for whom
they perform services generally should be treated as employees."' 60
This standard, however, both begs the difficult question of what is
economic independence and suggests categorizations that seem unsatisfactory under either the FLSA or the NLRA. As Judge Easterbrook
insightfully notes in considering the status of migrant farm workers
under the FLSA, 6t such workers, who may travel throughout the country looking for new work in each season, may be no more economically
dependent upon particular farms than those who sell fertilizer to the
farms or those who periodically repair the farms' equipment. 62 Similarly, application of an economic realities standard under the NLRA
might suggest that owners of an oil refinery's dealerships or those who
sell food concessions to the refinery's employee cafeterias should be
able to bargain collectively with the firm.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's presumption in Darden of a
single cross-statutory definition of employee 63 and to the Dunlop Commission's recommendation that Congress adopt the same definition of
employee for all federal employment and labor statutes," Judge Easterbrook argues that the coverage of the FLSA, as set by the definition
of employee, instead should be determined by its purposes: generally,
the protection of "workers without substantial human capital" from the
imposition of especially long hours and low wages. 65 The same should
be true for the NLRA: the coverage of this Act should be determined
58 Id. at 1059; see also Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 E2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating that "[e]conomic dependence is more than just another factor. It is instead the focus of
all the other considerations."); Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 E2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that existence of employer-employee relationship depends upon "whcthcr... the
individuals are dependent upon the business to which they render service"); Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d
at 143 (focusing on "whether the individual is... in business for himself").
59The Commission suggests that "low skill levels," "low wages" and "having one or fcw
employers" should all cut against independent contractor status, while workers presenting "themselves to the general public as an established business presence," having "a number of clients,"
and bearing "the economic risk of loss from their work" arc more likely "truly independent
entrepreneurs." DUNLOP Commissilo, supranote 50, at 38.
60
Id.
61Farmworkers are of course excluded from the coverage of the NLRA as "agricultural"

laborers. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
62
See Lauritzen, 835 F2d at 1539-42 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
63 See 503 U.S. at 323-26.
r4 See DUNLOP CoMuassioN, supra note 50, at 38.
65 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1543-45. Judge Easterbrook concludes that because "migrant workers are selling nothing but their labor" and "have no physical capital and little human capital to
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by its central substantive purpose-offering those who combine their
labor with traditional, nonhuman capital provided by others to bargain
collectively with such providers for a division of the returns from the
combination. 66 This purpose dictates coverage of all workers who sell
their labor, as enhanced by any special training or talent, to be combined primarily with capital provided by others. It excludes those who
sell a product or service that combines the workers' labor to a significant extent with their own nonhuman capital. This definition is
both appropriately broad and relatively predictable.
Consider, for example, the case of delivery drivers, the subject of
the current litigation on the independent contractor issue now before
the Board.67 A delivery driver's labor helps make productive the capital
invested in the goods delivered, the capital invested in the goods'
marketing and promotion and the capital invested in any delivery
system which the drivers serve. If the NLRA is to fulfill its promise of
allowing workers to combine to capture a larger share of returns from
the capital they help make productive, these facts should define delivery drivers as employees, regardless of whether their hiring firms
structure the drivers' work to meet the common law definition of
independent contractor. It should be irrelevant whether the hiring
firms control the drivers' routes, vehicles or dress, or whether the
drivers work for a number of hiring firms at the same time or work for
any particular firm for any particular time period. It also should be
irrelevant whether the drivers are required to own or lease their own
vehicles; the ownership of such a "tool or instrumentality," which could
easily be replicated by replacement workers, does not change the facts
stressed above, all of which indicate that most of the capital made
productive by the delivery driver's labor has been supplied by others.
Similarly, taxi drivers who utilize a central dispatching, marketing
and vehicle servicing system should be treated as employees, regardless
of the financing arrangements on their vehicles, the nature of their
reimbursement or the degree of their control over their own hours.
Janitors and other cleaning personnel who make capital investments
in buildings and businesses more productive are also employees, regardless of whether they provide their own cleaning supplies and tools
and control the manner of their own work. Additionally, nurses who
are referred work by an agency whose marketing investment and sysvend," they should be covered as employees under the FLSA '%vithout regard to the crop and
contract in each case." Id. at 1545.
66 See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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tern they make productive, are employees regardless of the nurses'
freedom to work simultaneously through other referral systems and of
any agency's level of supervision of their work.
Only those who sell their labor combined with a capital investment
that could not be replicated by replacement workers should be excluded as operators of independent businesses under the NLRA. This
excludes suppliers of inputs that themselves embody significant capital,
such as equipment and machines used at a refinery. It also excludes
distributors, such as the owner-operators of gas stations, who themselves have had to make the substantial capital investments in land,
equipment and goodwill necessary to engage successfully in the distribution.
Suppliers and distributors that combine their labor with their own
significant capital investments should be excluded from the coverage
of the Act for several interrelated reasons. First, after labor has been
combined with a significant capital investment, the Act's assumption
that individual bargaining does not necessarily yield an adequate and
fair price for the labor no longer applies. The capital provides the
laborer with bargaining leverage beyond that which his or her skills
can command. Second, labor's combination with capital places its sale
outside the pure labor markets which antitrust law and policy insulate
from prohibitions of concerted restraints. 68 Permitting suppliers or
distributors with significant capital investments to bargain collectively
with their customers would compromise antitrust policy further than
is necessary to accommodate the collectivization of labor markets.6 9
Third, the combination of labor with significant capital investments
renders the labor too variable to be combined in a bargaining unit
based on some community of interests of the laborers.
Admittedly, focusing on the level of independent capital investment to determine whether particular suppliers and distributors can
be included within the coverage of the Act will sometimes present hard
cases. Focusing on this factor, however, should make the resolution of
most cases much clearer than does the current multifactor approach
68See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503 (1940); Michael C. Harper,
Multiemployer Bargaining Antitrust Law, and Team Sports: The Contingent Choice of a Broad
Exemption, 38 Wm. & MARY L. Rv. 1663, 1669-75 (1997).
69
See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-37 (1941); Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S.
at 503 (determining that because § 6 of the Clayton Act states that "the labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce, .. . it would seem plain that restraints on the sale of
the employee's services to the employer, however much they curtail the competition among
employees, are not in themselves combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce
under the Sherman Act").
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suggested by the Supreme Court 7° and employed by the Board. 71 For
example, newspaper distributors that deliver papers from their own
vehicles (whether trucks, cars or bicycles) are very different than the
owner-operators of gas stations or other retail establishments. The
newspaper deliverers' capital investment is not significant relative to
that of the publisher whose papers they distribute. Even if the distributors are required to purchase the papers that they deliver and collect
their reimbursement from the ultimate consumers, they are not required to garner and risk any capital. The publishers almost exclusively
provide the capital on which the deliverers secure returns.
Of course, some distributors of newspapers and other goods may
gradually grow a multiple vehicle and multiple employee operation,
perhaps developing a substantial capital asset of "goodwill" with customers that is independent of the "goodwill" of the company whose
goods are being distributed. At some point, the growth of the distributors' capital stock should exclude them from coverage as employees
for two reasons. First, this capital stock provides the distributors with
special. bargaining leverage that the Act does not contemplate being
combined with the bargaining leverage of other heavily capitalized
distributors; second, the distributors' growth dissolves any community
of interest with distributors that do not enjoy similar capital leverage.
In most cases, in any event, the expansion of a distributor's business
would also exclude the distributor from the Act's coverage as a super72

visor.

Inasmuch as business growth is gradual, the Board sometimes
would have to draw fine lines, and it would not be possible to avoid all
litigation. But that litigation would be less burdensome than litigation
currently before the Board on the independent contractor issue, because the Board could apply the meaningful standard of whether the
distributors' nonhuman capital investments provided the distributors
with special bargaining leverage. This would be the case if that capital
could not be replicated easily by other potential replacement workers.
This typically would not be true for distributors that own single vehicles
that other workers granted delivery routes could obtain readily with or
70

See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.

71

See supra note 41.

72

The definition of "employee" in the NLRA, of course, expressly excludes "supervisors" as
well as "independent contractors." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). The definition of supervisor in the Act,
which includes individuals with the authority to "assign... or discipline ... or responsibly to
direct" other employees is surely sufficiently broad to exclude operators of satellite firms of any
substantial size. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11); see also NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S.
571, 573 (1994).

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39,329

without the employer's assistance. It typically would be true for distributors that have accumulated a fleet of vehicles or independent
"goodwill" with customers that could not be transferred to other distributors.
Nevertheless, workers should not be excluded from the NLRA's
coverage merely because of their investment in human capital. Human
capital and special skills provide bargaining leverage, but they do not
remove individuals from the labor market or necessarily render it
inappropriate for them to bargain in collective units of similarly skilled
individuals.73 Thus, those who produce at home, without significant
capital investment, products such as computer software or special craft
goods to be sold to and through manufacturers of integrated products
or retail stores, can be contrasted sharply with owner-operators of
independently manufactured inputs. The special skills that computer
programmers or traditional craftspersons bring to their work should
not be relevant to their treatment as employees.

III.

CAPITAL PROVISION AND THE DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER UNDER
THE

NLRA

Although reformulating the definition of covered employees is an
important goal, it would not repair the most important breach in the
Act's coverage of economic relationships that should be subject to
collective bargaining. Even more so than the breach created by the
exclusion of workers as independent contractors under traditional
agency law, 74 the continuing segmentation of modern labor markets
has made more salient the inadequacy of the doctrine developed to
determine the employers with whom covered employees can demand
to bargain collectively. That doctrine allows firms to insulate their
capital from collective bargaining by delegating most of the supervisory control over the laborers that help make that capital productive,
even in cases where the workers require too much supervisory control
to be treated as independent contractors. This is done by leasing
employees from an employment agency that retains authority to hire,
fire, discipline and conduct most of the supervision of the employees.
It is also done by contracting out the responsibility to complete particular work using the capital of the firm.
7
5 Otherwise, the NLRA would not protect collective bargaining for professional athletes and
entertainers or even for skilled construction workers. See generally Harper, supra note 68.
74
See supra notes 20-44 and accompanying text.
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The Board, with judicial support, has long held that two or more
firms can be "joint employers" of the same employees if they each
"exert significant control" over the employees.75 Under the Board's
current application of this doctrine, firms that retain the authority to
hire, fire, discipline or substantially supervise the day-to-day work of
employees also under the control of an employment leasing agency or
subcontractor may be considered, along with the leasing agency or
subcontractor, "jointemployers" of these employees.76 Firms that allow
an agency or subcontractor to exercise most significant supervisory
77
and disciplinary authority may escape all bargaining duties, however.
This is true even where the delegating "client" firms reserve by contract
the authority to supervise 78 or where the client firms effectively set the
workers' compensation levels and working conditions through their
control of the capital being employed and through contracts with the
79
agency or subcontractor.
The delegation of supervisory authority to other employers thus
enables firms to escape the basic compromise that the NLRA generally
imposes on the owners of capital-the requirement that they bargain
collectively with employees who make that capital productive. Without
first bargaining in good faith to impasse, an employer of union-represented employees cannot transfer the work of these employees to the
employees of an employment agency or subcontractor simply because
the union-represented employees have imposed higher labor costs
than would be imposed by the agency or subcontractor.80 A firm that
75See, e.g., NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1982) ("where two
or more employers exert significant control over the same employees... they constitute 'joint
employers' within the meaning of the NLRA"); C. R. Adams Trucking, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 563,
566 (1982), enforced, 718 F.2d 869, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1983); Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488,
1495 (1965), enforced, 368 F.2d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376
U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (endorsing Board inquiry into whether firm "possessed sufficient control
over the work of [another employer's] employees to qualify as a joint employer").
76 See, e.g., Rivera-Vega v. Conagra, Inc., 70 F.3d 153, 163 (1st Cir. 1995); NLRB v. Western
Temporary Serv., Inc., 821 F.2d 1258, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1987); Quantum Resources Corp., 305
N.L.R.B. 759, 761 (1991); Trend Constr. Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. 295, 299 (1982).
77See generally Trinity Maintenance, 312 N.L.R.B. 715 (1993) (control over employee's use
of work premises not sufficient for joint employer status); G. Wes Ltd. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 225
(1992) (limited and routine supervision by client firm not sufficient for joint employer status).
78
See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 312 N.L.R.B. 674, 677 (1993). But if TLI, Inc., 271
N.L.R.B. 798, 803 (1984) (joint employer relationship found where operational control was
reserved by contract and was exercised).
79
See, e.g., Millcraft Paper Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 812, 814 (1984) (firm not joint employer of
drivers delivering its goods because its supervision was only "incidental"); Laerco Transp., 269
N.L.R.B. 324, 325-26 (1984) (trucking and warehousing company leasing drivers and warehouse
workers under a cost-plus contract was not a joint employer).
80 See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964) (employer must

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:329

has avoided joint employer status by a sufficient delegation of supervisory authority to another employer, however, can transfer work from
one agency or subcontractor to another without bargaining because
the first agency or subcontractor has allowed labor costs to climb too
high.8 1 Indeed, the Board has held that a contracting employer with no
bargaining obligations can transfer work away from a subcontractor's
82
employees simply because these employees have organized a union.
The use of employee leasing agencies and the subcontracting of
supervisory authority over workers has made vulnerable an increasing
number of American workers to the denial of the core promise of the
NLRA.8 3 Consider, for instance, drivers who load and deliver goods in
trucks and from warehouses owned by a large trucking company that
also contracts with the owners of the goods for their deliveries. Assume

bargain over "the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an
independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment"); Dorsey
Trailers, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 616, 616-17 (1996); Torrington Indus., 307 N.L.R.B. 809, 810-11
(1992).
8t
See Southern Cal. Gas Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 456, 461-62 (1991).
8
2See Local No. 447, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipefitting Indus., 172 N.L.R.B. 128, 129 (1968) ("an employer does not discriminate against
employees... by ceasing to do business with another employer because of the union or nonunion
activity of the latter's employees"). But cf. Dews Constr. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 n.4 (1977)
(client-employer commits unfair labor practice if, rather than ceasing to do business with contractor, "it directs, instructs, or orders another employer with whom it has business dealings to
discharge, layoff, transfer, or otherwise affects the working conditions of the latter's employees
because of [their] union activity"). In my view, Local No. 447 rests on shaky ground and should
be overturned, whether or not the definition ofjoint employer is expanded. See 172 N.L.RB. at
129.
SSAccording to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' comprehensive 1995 report on contingent
employment relationships, temporary help agencies employed 1.2 million people in the middle
of this decade. SeeU.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOY-MENT ARRANGEamrs, REPORT 900 1 (1995). Private estimates of the number of workers employed by such
agencies in 1996 were over 2.3 million. See generally BRUCE STEINBERG, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF TEMPORARY AND STAFFING SERVICES, ThMPORARY HELP SERVICES: 1996 PERFORMANCE REVIEW
(1997), reprintedfrom CONTEM'FORARY TiNiEs, Spring 1997, at 47. This employment represents
rapid growth and perhaps a shift from the direct recruiting of temporary workers by firms. See
LAWRENCE MISCHEL &JARED BERNSTEIN, Tim STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, 1994-95 230-34 (use
of temporary employment agencies more than doubled since 1982; 97% of large firms using such
agencies); see also Glenn Burkins, Temp Workers May Be Able To Join Unions, WALL ST.J., Dec. 2,
1996, at A3 (Manpower Inc., the nation's largest employment agency, reports employing 800,000
people in 1996 and growth in billable hours of about 12% per year).
There is also evidence that there has been a substantial increase in subcontracting ovcr the

past two decades. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUSINESS CONTRACTING-OUT PRACTICES, SUMMiARY REPORT 87-88 (1987) (increased use of subcontracting in almost all industries from 1979
to 1986); Bill Kelley, Outsourcing Marches On, J. Bus. STRATEGY, July 1, 1995, at 39 (44% of
executives report increase in outsourcing over five years ending in 1993). See generally BENNETT
HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN: TE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE POWER IN TiE AGE OF
FLEXIaBILTY 130 (1994).
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that the drivers are hired and formally employed by an agency that
manages their pay, grievances and discipline, and also supplies firstlevel supervisors to provide the drivers with most of their day-to-day
direction. The drivers may wish to form a union to attempt to bargain
collectively for a larger share of the returns that their labor has helped
the trucking company garner. They will be hesitant to do so, however,
after an agent for the employment agency tells them that the trucking
company may terminate its contract with the agency if the drivers
84
organize.
If the drivers nonetheless have the temerity to choose a union
representative, the employment agency may tell them that the agency
has a labor cost-plus contract with the trucking company and that any
increase in labor costs would lead to termination of the contract; in
any event, the agency does not have any resources that would support
pay enhancement. Any request by the drivers to discuss their wages
with the trucking company, the entity with effective control over their
wage level, legally could be rebuffed. If the drivers went on strike to
place pressure on the trucking company as well as the leasing agency,
they not only could be replaced readily by employees from another
agency, but they also would not be able to picket the trucking company
because it would be protected from economic pressure as a secondary
neutral employer with no obligations toward the first agency's drivers.85
This kind of scenario undoubtedly describes dilemmas faced by a
vast number of American workers today in a wide variety ofjobs, from
janitors to nurses and truckers to typists. For workers formally employed and supervised by an agency or subcontractor that does not
supply the primary capital with which the workers combine their labor,
the promise of the NLRA must ring hollow.
The Dunlop Commission at least acknowledges this problem, concluding that "the client should be liable if its own decisions or actions
with respect to the contract serve to deny the workers their legal rights
under labor-relations law."86 The Commission, however, hesitates to
84

The Board has held that a contractor does not commit an unfair labor practice by truthfully

informing its employees that its client does not want them to unionize. See NLRB v. Pentre Elec.,
Inc., 998 K2d 363, 369-71 (6th Cir. 1993). Assuming the client-firm can legally terminate the
contract with the employment agency because of the employees' union activity, this doctrine is
sensible; employees should fairly be advised of the probable consequences of their actions.
85 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1994). The drivers would not be able to picket terminals of
the trucking company other than those at which they worked. See id. Moreover, after the company
had replaced the employment agency with another subcontractor, the drivers presumably would
not even be able to picket the terminals at which they did work because the terminals would no

longer
be the work sites of their employer, the first employment agency. See id.
86
DUNLOP Co,MCssIoN, supra note 50, at 41.
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make "clients responsible for the actions of contractors over whose
operations and employees they have little control," 7 and does not
recommend a reconceptualization of the issue. Instead, it only recommends in a footnote that "for a client whose contractor's employees
vote to unionize to terminate the contract as a result" should be a
8
violation of labor law.
In my view, there is a conceptual problem in the Board's and
judiciary's interpretation of the meaning of employer under the
NLRA. It is the same conceptual problem that exists in the current
interpretation of employee under the Act-the emphasis is on the
question of supervisory control, rather than on the provision of capital.
For purposes of defining the employers with whom covered employees
should have a right to bargain collectively, supervisory control does
provide a sensible test for inclusion; organized employees should be
able to bargain with a firm that manages their supervision, discipline
and grievances. The test, however, should not be used to exclude as
bargaining objects other employers that provide a substantial proportion of the capital directly made productive by the employees. If workers are to be assured the opportunity to utilize collective bargaining
leverage to extract a greater share of the returns from their labor, they
must be able to bargain with the firms that provide the capital.
A definition of joint employer that includes firms providing significant capital directly made productive by the employees' work, as
well as firms with significant supervisory control over the employees,
would help fulfill the NLRA's promise of collective bargaining for
many American employees. The use of employee leasing agencies that
provide only employee recruitment and supervisory services would not
enable firms to avoid collective bargaining with employees who help
generate returns for the firms' capital investments.8 9 Similarly, firms
could not avoid collective bargaining through arrangements with subcontractors that do not provide most of the capital that their employees
make productive.

87

Id.
88Id. at n.13.
89See, e.g., Martiki Coal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 476, 478 (1994) (owner of coal mine no longer
joint employer of coal miners supplied by management agency because mine ou car stopped dally
supervision of miners, ceased prehire testing and required agency to bring employees to work in
its own van). Compare the Board's earlier approach, more in line with the general compromise
of the Act, injewell Smokeless Coal Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 392,393 (1968) (finding a coal processor
a joint employer given the "industrial realities of the coal mining industry"); see also Jewell
Smokeless Coal Corp., 175 N.L.R.B. 57 (1969), enforced, 435 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1970).
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For example, a building owner that engaged a cleaning services
contractor would be legally required to bargain, along with the contractor, concerning the compensation and working conditions of the
cleaning workers. The union could not insist on bargaining concerning the division of management authority or returns between the
employees' two employers or on the ultimate source of the employees'
compensation, but it could insist that both employers guarantee the
level of that compensation. The building owner would not be allowed
to transfer the cleaning contract because the contractor's employees
had organized a union, 90 or because they had demanded higher wages
than the owner wanted to pay.91
Like any employers required to bargain in good faith under the
NLRA, the building owner and cleaning contractor could bargain to
impasse insisting on a particular wage level, and if the cleaners collectively refused to work, the cleaning contractor could employ replacement workers.92 But the building owner should not be able to retaliate
against the protected strike by shifting to another cleaning contractor
to provide replacements. Unlike the hiring of permanent replacements, a shift in subcontractors is likely to destroy completely the
bargaining unit9 3 and seldom would be necessary to maintain operations. Any shift of subcontractors to lower labor costs thus should
require bargaining to impasse. Nor should the building owner be able
to claim protection as a secondary employer from union picketing of
its building, or of other buildings it might own. As a joint employer
with the cleaning contractor, the building owner should not be treated
as an "other person" under the secondary boycott proscription in
94
section 8 (b) (4) (B) of the Act.

90 To do so would be to discourage union membership or activity in violation of sections
8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) oftheAct. See29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3). If the capital provider is not defined
as ajoint employer, under current Board doctrine it may terminate a service contract in response

to the service contractor's employees' choice of a union. See supra note 82 and accompanying
text.
91 See, e.g., Executive Cleaning Serv., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 227, 227 (1994); W. W. Grainger, Inc.,
286 N.L.R.B. 94, 96-97 (1987) (joint employers must bargain before shifting contracts to reduce
labor costs). See also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
92See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
93See, e.g., Land Air Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, 862 F.2d 354, 357, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(agreeing, for this reason, with the Board's distinction between hiring of permanent replacements
and using permanent subcontractors, but reserving judgment on whether "permanent subcontracting may be undertaken without first bargaining when needed to continue operations"). For
an analysis of how NLRA successorship doctrine could be changed to maintain the bargaining
unit after a switch of subcontractors, see infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
94
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B). Other clients of the cleaning contractor, however, should be
treated as neutral, secondary employers. See id. Therefore, picketing of their premises while the
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Other primary providers of direct capital should be treated the
same as the building owner in the last example. For instance, any
financial services firm that utilizes clerical workers supplied and supervised by an employment agency would have to bargain, along with the
agency, with any union chosen by the workers. A hospital that contracts
with a nursing services firm to provide patient rehabilitation in one of
its departments would also have to bargain with any union representing the nurses. A building owner that engages a guard services
contractor, like the building owner who engages a cleaning service,
legally would be required to bargain with a recognized union. Any
capital investments made by contractors in firearms, or cleaning materials, do not render insignificant the capital investments in office buildings or factories that security guards or cleaners directly enhance.
Indeed, a firm also should have to bargain with union-organized workers who enhance the firm's operations through construction work on
the firm's facilities. Construction workers may contribute directly and
substantially to the capital of building owners as well as to that of the
construction firms that supervise their labor.
Although a direct-capital-provider definition of employer under
the Act thus would be significantly broader than the current supervisory control-based definition, it could be applied with relatively clear
limitations. First, this definition would not allow employees of retail or
wholesale distributors normally to claim to be employees of the manufacturer of the product as well. Such employees directly contribute to
the retailer's or wholesaler's investment in its revolving inventory,
stores, warehouses and fleets of delivery vehicles. The manufacturer
may continue to invest in advertising and other product promotion
after selling its products to distributors, but after such sales, distributors' employees only contribute indirectly to the productivity of manufacturer investments.
The primacy of the distributor firm's capital contribution to the
productivity of its employees is clearest when the distributor markets a
range of products from different manufacturers. Even when a distributor, such as a retail gas outlet, concentrates its efforts on the sale of a
particular manufacturer's products, its employees primarily and directly contribute to its own capital investments. Only where the distributor has not made its own substantial capital investments, but
merely manages the manufacturer's inventory and the use of buildings
cleaning contractor is doing work there should be treated as secondary because the cleaning
contractor's work for the other clients is not the disputed work. Cf. Sailors' Union, 92 N.L.R.B.
547, 549 (1950) (picketing must be "strictly limited to times when the silus of dispute is located
on the secondary employer's premises").
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and vehicles that the manufacturer has financed, should the distributor's employees be able to claim the right to bargain collectively with
the manufacturer as employees who directly contribute to its capital
investments.
A direct-capital-provider definition of employer also would exclude as employees of the manufacturers of completed goods the
employees of manufacturers of component parts. For instance, truck
manufacturers would not be considered the employers of workers in a
factory that produces and sells tires to the truck manufacturer as
complete component parts. The tire workers' labor is combined with
the capital of the tire manufacturer to produce the tires sold, as a
combined product of capital and labor, to the truck manufacturer. The
tires help make the truck manufacturer's capital productive, but the
tire workers never directly combine their labor with the truck manufacturer's capital.9 5
One could argue that the distinction suggested above between
workers producing component parts through an independent firm for
the truck manufacturer and construction laborers working directly
with capital owned by the truck manufacturer ignores the comparable
economic dependence of both sets of workers upon the truck manufacturer. Indeed, the tire workers may be even more dependent on the
truck manufacturer if they are employed in a plant that exclusively or
primarily fills orders from the truck manufacturer. Nevertheless, a line
based on capital ownership is not only relatively predictable and easy
to apply; it is also consistent with both the Act's general compromise
of unions' ability to control labor markets96 and its current proscription
97
of secondary boycotts.
Admittedly, tension exists between the Act's general compromise
and the secondary boycott prohibition, where the component part
manufacturer does not provide sufficient capital to support meaningful bargaining with its workers. This tension justifies exemptions from
the secondary boycott prohibitions, such as that embodied for the
garment industry in section 8 (e) of the Act 98 A predictable, direct-capital-provider test of a joint employer, at least if combined with a capi-

95
Consider also a typical shopping center. While the shopping center developer and owner
would have to bargain with unions representing the construction workers that erected the
buildings at the center, the stores that leased these buildings would not because they merely
purchased use of the completed buildings as a component part of their retailing effort. Even the
truck manufacturer could avoid bargaining duties toward workers constructing a new plant if it
only was under contract to lease the plant upon its completion.
96
See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
97See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B).
98See id. § 158(e).
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tal-based definition of independent contractor, 99 however, should provide adequate doctrine for the protection of the Act's basic compromise.
Full protection of this compromise would require the Board, without the consent of any employer, to include employees jointly-employed by a primary capital provider and supervising contractor or
agency in the same bargaining unit as other employees who share a
community of interests, but who are solely-employed by the capital
provider. Allowing unions to organize jointly-employed employees in
bargaining units with similar solely-employed workers is important
because jointly-employed employees are usually more temporary and
therefore harder to organize than a capital provider's traditional workforce. In addition, even if leased employees are successfully organized
in a unit separate from that of solely-employed, more permanent
employees, the unit of leased employees normally would possess limited bargaining leverage. Thus, defining a bargaining unit broadly to
include both jointly-employed and solely-employed workers reduces
the incentive for the capital provider to attempt to escape collective
bargaining by replacing its organized, traditional, solely-employed employees with leased employees still under its supervisory control.
The Board, however, currently allows each joint employer to veto
the inclusion of its joint employees in a bargaining unit that also
includes other workers solely-employed by the primary provider of
capital. 10 0 It does so based upon doctrine that it developed soon after
passage of the NLRA. This doctrine allows bargaining units of more
than one competitive employer in an industry only when each employer and the union consents. 101 This doctrine understandably reserves for each potential competitive provider of capital the discretion
to compete rather than cooperate in bargaining with unions, but its

99

Under the capital-based definition of independent contractor suggested above, component
production workers are like independent craft artists or computer programmers, who work on
their own without significant capital outlays and should be treated as employees. See supra notes
66-73 and accompanying text. Their employer should be the manufacturer whose distribution
system provided the primary capital to which their labor contributed, even in cases where their
labor was not directly combined with this capital. See id.
100 See, e.g., Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1268 (1995); Hexacomb Corp., 313 N.LR.B. 983, 983 (1994); Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 313 N.L.R.B. 592, 593
(1993); Flatbush Manor Care, 313 N.L.R.B. 591,591 (1993). The Board is currently reconsidering

this approach in Jeffboat Division, American Conmercial & MarineServs. Co., NLRB, 9-UC-406,
M.B. Sturgis Inc., NLRB, 14-RC-1 1572, and Value Recycle Inc., NLRB, 33-RC-4042.
101See, e.g., Aluminum Line, 8 N.L.R.B. 1325, 1341 (1938); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7
N.L.R.B. 662, 692-700 (1938); Des Moines Steel Co., 6 N.L.RB. 532, 535-36 (1938). See also 3
NLRB ANNUAL REPORT 194-95 (1938).
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rationale is not at all applicable to employers who are cooperating in
an effort to make particular capital productive. 1 2 Indeed, until its
recent decisions refusing to allow jointly-employed employees to be
10 3
included with those solely-employed by a primary capital provider,
the Board did require cooperating employers to bargain jointly with a
union representing both classes of employees in an otherwise appropriate unit.1°4Moreover, this requirement for cooperatingemployers was
not necessarily abrogated by the case that the Board cites as establishing the applicability of the multi-employer consent requirement for
the inclusion of jointly and solely-employed employees in the same
unit, Greenhoot, Inc.10 5 This case concerned a union effort to compel
competing building owners to combine all of their engineers and maintenance employees in the same unit, on the basis that each of the
owners were joint employers with the same property management
1 06
service.

102

The Senate bill introduced by Senator Taft in 1947 included a provision that would have
codified the Board's practice of not approving, without the consent of each employer, bargaining
units of employees employed by multiple employers that compete in some product market, but
join together in a trade association. See S. 1126, 80th Cong., § 2(2) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG.
HiST. OF TnE LMRA, supra note 25, at 102. This proposal reflected concerns about labor unions
using trade associations as a basis for centralizing their control over labor relations in an entire
industry through the threat and use of industry-wide strikes. See, e.g., 93 CONG. Rc. 3533 (1947)
(statement of Rep. Hartley), rprinted in 1 LEG. HisT. OF Tim LMRA, supra note 25, at 612; 93
CONG. REc. 3547-48 (1947) (statement ofRep. Schwabe), reprintedin 1 LEG. HIsT. OF Thm LMRA,
supra note 25, at 636; 93 CONG. REc. 3575-76 (1947) (statement of Rep. Fisher), reprinted in 1
LEG. HisT. oF THE LMRA, supra note 25, at 672-74. The legislative history reflects no concern
with the inclusion in a single unit of employees of multiple employers who are cooperating in
some joint effort to make their capital productive. Moreover, the provision was not enacted
because, as explained in the House Conference Report, "it merely restates the existing practice
of the Board." H.R. Cour. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., at 31-32 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST.
OF TnE LMRA, supranote 25, at 535-36. This existing practice required the inclusion in one unit
of the employees of cooperating employers. See, e.g., Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 579,
584 (1946) (jointly-employed workers in a department store included in a bargaining unit with
other employees solely-employed by store); Hale Bros. Stores, Inc., 62 N.L.R.B. 367, 371 (1945)
(same); see also Fischer Lumber Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 543, 546-47 (1945) (including truck drivers
jointly-employed by logging company with other workers solely-employed by logging company).
103
See supra note 100.
104 See cases cited at end of note 102 supra; see also North Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B.
1317, 1320-22 (1978), enforced, 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980); President & Trustees of Bowdoin
College, 190 N.L.R.B. 193, 194 (1971); Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., 175 N.L.R.B. 57 (1969),
enforced, 435 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1970);Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 392,393 (1968);
S.S. Kresge Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 442, 444 (1968), enforced in reL par4 416 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1969);
Jewel Tea Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 508, 510-11 (1966); Stineway Drug Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1630, 1633
(1953).5
'° See 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973).

106
See id.
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Once it is understood why the primary provider of capital should
be treated as an employer, it is also easy to understand why the Board
should modify its current doctrine on bargaining units that combine
direct and leased employees. The primary provider of capital establishes the enterprise that both the direct and leased employees help
make productive with their labor. The employment leasing agency or
managerial subcontractor only should be included as ajoint employer
of some employees to the extent of the primary employer's managerial
decision to divide supervisory responsibility. This inclusion should not
affect the mutuality of interests of the direct and leased employees in
attempting to obtain a greater share of the returns of the primary
employer's capital. No basic conflict of interest exists between the
provider of capital and the employee leasing company, as exists between employers who compete in a particular product market and who
might not wish to subject themselves to joint bargaining with a particular union. The rationale for conditioning the recognition of multi-employer units on employer consent thus does not apply to units that
combine jointly-employed, leased employees and direct employees of
the same primary employer.
This does not mean that every union-proposed, or employer-proposed, unit that would combine solely and jointly-employed employees
should be considered appropriate. The Board still should apply its
normal mutuality or community of interests standards. It should be
sensitive to the possibility that the joint employees have been assigned
different, separable work and thus have a conflict of interest with the
direct employees.10 7 The Board also should apply its normal, somewhat
more rigorous, community-of-interests standards before accreting a
new group of leased employees to an extant bargaining unit without
the new employees having an opportunity to vote for union repre107Some of the Board's community-of-interests standards often would provide a basis for

placing jointly-employed, more temporary employees in units separate from those of their solelyemployed, more permanent counterparts. Consider the factors listed in the Board's often cited
decision in KalamazooPaperBox Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962):
[A] difference in method of wages or compensation; different hours of work;
different employment benefits; separate supervision; the degree of dissimilar
qualifications, training, and skills; differences in job functions and amount of
working .. .; the infrequency or lack of contact with other employees; lack of
integration with the work functions of other employees or interchange with them;
and the history of bargaining.
Under these standards, where jointly-employed leased employees have been assigned separate
work, different supervisors and different benefits, where they are not interchanged with permanent employees and where their work and tenure has been treated as temporary, it would be
difficult to include them in the permanent employees' unit. See Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136
N.L.R.B. at 137.
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sentation in a certification election. 08 The Board, however, should not
allow employers simply to veto the inclusion ofjointly-employed, leased
employees in appropriate units containing solely-employed, direct employees.
Where a union, as in Greenhoot,109 seeks to represent in one unit
the employees of a management subcontractor or of an employee
leasing firm who are also employees of.different primary providers of
capital, the issue is different. On the one hand, the primary providers
of capital, such as the owners of the office buildings in Greenhoot, may
compete against each other in their product markets. To force them
to adopt the same labor policy simply because they have engaged the
same joint employer contractor seems to be in tension with requiring
multi-employer bargaining to be consensual," 0 as well as with the Act's
guarantee of the freedom of independent capital to bargain freely for
its interests.'
On the other hand, conditioning the inclusion of temporary,
jointly-employed employees in a unit defined by employment with the
leasing firm on the consent of its clients could deny many employees
of temporary employment agencies any chance of organizing a union.
The reason is that the Board has held that "temporary" or "casual"
employees, who are to be employed at a particular work site for only
a limited duration, cannot be included in a unit defined by that work
site." 2 If temporary workers, who are employed by a leasing firm and
frequently are transferred between potentially competitive employers,
cannot be organized in a unit defined by the leasing firm, then under

105 See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 210, Int'l Brth. of Teamsters, 330 F.2d 46, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1964);
C.I.M. Mechanical Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 685, 685 (1985) (Dennis, Member, concurring); Melbet
Jewelry Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 107, 109 (1969); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1183, 1186-87
(1944). See generallyJoHN E. ABODEELY ET AL., ThE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING
UNIT 138-48 (rev. ed. 1981).
109
See 205 N.L.R.B. at 250.
10 If, however, the competitive providers of capital have decided to cooperate in the imposition of a labor policy by the delegation ofjoint control of their employees to the same employee
management contractor, a strong case can be made that the inclusion of the employees of the
various capital providers in the same unit is appropriate. Cf.NLRB v. Checker Cab Co., 367 F.2d
692, 698 (6th Cir. 1966), enforcing 141 N.L.R.B. 583 (1963) (where "agroup of employers have
banded themselves together so as to set up joint machinery for hiring employees and for
establishing working rules for employees... [these are] facts we believe to be 'sufficient indicia
of control' to warrant the joint employer finding"); North Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B. at
1320-22 (finding a league-wide unit of employees appropriate because of the substantial control
exercised by the league over employment conditions).
I" See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 140 N.L.RB. 1323, 1326 (1963); E.F. Drew &
Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 155, 156-57 (1961); Sealite, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 619, 620 (1959).

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:329

current Board practice, 113 they may have no realistic organizing options.
To resolve this dilemma, it would not be sufficient for the Board
to liberalize its standards for including temporary employees in units
defined by temporary work sites. Workers whose jobs have set, limited
durations may have little common interest with the more permanent
employees and also may not be able to organize during their short
tenure at a particular site. The Board therefore should determine that
it is appropriate for temporary workers who shift frequently between
various primary capital providers to be included in units defined by
the employment agency or contractor with whom their employment is
more continuous." 4 Greenhoot,however, should not be overruled; units
defined by an employment agency or independent contractor also
should not be defined by the capital providers as joint employers. If a
union wishes to include leased employees in a joint employer unit, it
should be required to petition for a separate unit that would include
only the employees of a particular primary provider of capital. Where
there is a sufficient community of interest, the Board should prefer
such joint employer units, even for leased employees currently in a
unit defined only by employment with the leasing agency or contractor.
IV. CAPITAL PROVISION AND SUCCESSORSHIP LAW UNDER THE

NLRA

In my view, however, without modification of NLRA successorship
law, even expanded definitions of employee and joint employer based
on an analysis of the source of capital contributions would not fully
secure the basic promise of American labor law against the impact of
the increasing segmentation of the American workforce. Current law
allows the primary providers of capital to avoid both the collective
bargaining agreement and the collective bargaining obligation of an
employee management firm by contracting with a new firm to manage
a new set of employees who contribute in the same manner to the
productivity of the same capital.
5
The leading case remains NLRB v. Burns Security Services, Inc."
In Burns, the United States Supreme Court held that a firm that had
just secured a contract to manage guards to protect an independent
firm's major capital investment had to bargain with the union that had
113 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
114Cf. All-Work, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 918, 919 (1971) (directing an election of all employces
referred by an agency to a variety of customers that supervised the employees' work in short
assignments "on a day-to-day basis").
115406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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represented the employees who had been providing the same services
under the management of a different firm. The Court so held, however, only because a majority of the employees hired to do the same
work by the new guard management firm had been employed by the
prior contractor.1 6 The new contractor would have been free to avoid
the old contractor's collective bargaining obligation if it had hired new
employees. Furthermore, the Court held that the new contractor did
not have to observe the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
that recently had been signed by the old contractor, notwithstanding
its hiring of the guards formerly managed by the old contractor11 This
holding enabled the firm, whose substantial capital investment was
being guarded, to escape without the withdrawal of this investment, a
collective bargaining agreement that it viewed as granting an exces18
sively high share of the returns of the investment to the guards.
Expanding the definition of joint employer, as suggested above,
would mitigate the impact of Burns on employees in the segmented
workforce. Primary providers of capital defined as joint employers
would not be able to terminate a management service contract in
reaction to employeesjointly-employed by the capital provider and the
contractor organizing a union or engaging in concerted activity, such
as a strike." 9 Furthermore, a provider of capital defined as a joint
employer, just like a sole employer with bargaining obligations, would
have to bargain to impasse with represented employees on issues such
as wage increases before engaging a new subcontractor who pays lower
wages. 120 In my view, as suggested above, these two doctrines together
should mean that the provider of capital may not transfer an employee
management subcontract in response to a strike without first bargain2
ing to impasse about the decision to change a subcontractor. '
Even an expanded definition of joint employer would not suffice
to counter fully the holdings of Burns, however. Labor law generally
does, 122 and should,

23

require employers, whether or not joint, to

6

11 See id. at 278-79.
1

7

See id. at 281-91.

sSee

id.

1 9

10 See supranote 90 and accompanying text.
12 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., Mid-State Ready Mix, 307 N.LR.B. 809, 810-11 (1992). See also Fibreboard Paper
Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964) (noting that no "capital investment" was involved
in the decision to subcontract maintenance work in that case).
"23 See generally Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National
Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining,68 VA. L. REv. 1447, 1475-77 (1982) (arguing
that only a subset of subcontracting decisions involving a withdrawal of capital, those that entail
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bargain over decisions to subcontract that do not entail the withdrawal
of capital investments. Labor law does not, however, and should not,
prevent employers from switching subcontractors after bargaining to
impasse to reduce costs. This is most obviously true for cases in which
the employer wants to switch an employee management contractor
because of concerns about the efficiency of the contractor that do not
relate to the labor costs that the contractor has allowed to be imposed
on the primary employer. Even where the primary employer wants to
switch employee management firms because of a concern about labor
costs, however, it can do so after bargaining to impasse. Consistent with
its basic compromise of requiring employers to bargain, without requiring them to accept particular terms, the NLRA has never been interpreted as preventing an employer from making a managerial decision
after bargaining to impasse, regardless of the effect of that decision on
124
represented employees.
Given the successorship doctrine established in Burns,125 this necessary and appropriate employer discretion to transfer employee management contracts after bargaining to impasse nonetheless creates a
fault line in the Act's basic compromise1 26 As a result of the decision
in Burns, employers can escape a bargaining relationship by insisting
127
on a transfer of authority to a new employee management contractor.
This cracks the basic compromise of the Act because it not only frees
employers from the governmental imposition of terms, it also frees
them both from a collective bargaining relationship chosen by their
employees and from what the employees have attained from such a
relationship. It effectively allows the collective bargaining relationship
itself to be a subject of mandatory bargaining over which a primary
a change in product, should be excluded from the mandatory duty to bargain); Michael L.
Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining:An Introduction
and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting,PartialClosure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 1349 (1988) (subcontracting decisions that do not withdraw capital or reduce the labor
hours contributed to capital should be subject to mandatory bargaining).
24
1 See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. As explained by Wachter and Cohen, when
an employer must bargain in good faith to impasse before withdrawing benefits, such as employment and high wages, those benefits are "entitlements protected by bargaining rules." SeeWachtcr
& Cohen, supra note 123, at 1371. Wachter and Cohen base their analysis on the seminal
distinction between liability and property rules drawn in Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,

Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089
(1972). If the Labor Act secured some substantive benefit such as high wages or employment for
union-represented workers, it would provide employees entitlements protected by property rules.
However, the Act provides this kind of property protection to employees only for certain proccdural entitlements, such as the right to bargain collectively, not for substantive entitlements to
benefits. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1994).
12See 406 U.S. at 272.
126 See id. at 281.
127 See id. at 280-81.
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provider of capital can force an impasse and from which it can escape
after impasse. 128 Under Burns, a provider of capital that disapproves of
the wage rate that employees managed by a particular employee management contractor have obtained can propose a new management
contractor, bargain to impasse, transfer the contract and then watch
the contractor hire new employees and escape further collective bargaining responsibilities. 1 29 Any of the old employees that choose to
strike may be replaced by the new firm's employees because the proposal to have a new subcontractor has already been subjected to bar30
gaining.
The way to repair this crack is to reformulate successorship law.
Again, the analysis should focus on the primary capital directly made
productive by the affected employees. The collective bargaining relationship chosen by employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining
should attach to the primary capital that the unit directly makes productive. Only the withdrawal of this capital, or an adequate rebuttal of
the presumption of continued employee support for the bargaining
agent, should dissolve this relationship. A transfer of authority to hire
and manage the employees that make the capital productive should
not.
Under this reformulation, any new management contractor would
not be able to change the 'status quo in the bargaining unit without
first bargaining to impasse after the expiration of an extant contract.
The new contractor would thus have to offer employment to the
incumbent employees at the wage rate at which they were working
under the old manager. If the old collective bargaining agreement had
not expired, the new manager and the primary provider of capital
would have to observe the contract until its expiration. This does not
violate the Act's principle of non-imposition of contract terms because
the provider of capital was a party to the bargaining relationship that
produced the contract and the new manager voluntarily became part
of that relationship.' 3' If the old agreement had expired, the new
128 It is thus in tension with the Supreme Court decision confirming that some compromises
cannot be forced on parties through collective bargaining. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958) (employer cannot insist that certified bargaining agent
not be a party to collective agreement). In the law and economics parlance employed by Wachter
& Cohen, successorship law thereby operates to deny the procedural property entitlement in a
collective bargaining relationship that the Act purports to secure, transforming it into only an
entitlement protected by bargaining rules. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 123, at 1371-72.
120 See 406 U.S. at 281.
13 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
I1 Cf. North Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(collective bargaining obligations and agreements can be imposed on clubs that join sports
leagues as new joint employers).
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management firm and the provider of capital could negotiate a new
agreement while maintaining the old terms. After negotiating in good
faith to impasse for new terms, they could unilaterally implement such
terms. If the union called a strike in opposition, the new joint employers could hire replacement workers under current law.
This reformulation would not prevent primary employers from
shifting employee management contractors to obtain more efficient
management. It would not even prevent them from shifting contractors in the hope of reducing wage rates. Indeed, if the new contractor
had to maintain, through good faith bargaining, the same terms as the
old contractor, the primary employer should not have to bargain about
the choice of a new contractor. 32 The reformulation would simply
require the new joint employers to allow employees, who had chosen
to bargain collectively to obtain a greater share of the capital that they
help make productive, to continue to do so. Such employees would
face the risk of job loss only where the capital is withdrawn or where
they choose to strike and risk replacements being hired by employers
133
whom they can picket in defense.
The fact that the new contractor, as in Burns, 34 already has a
collective bargaining agreement or agreements with another union
should be irrelevant. As explained above, 135 the joint employer bargaining unit should not extend beyond employees who primarily contribute to the productivity of the capital of a single employer, unless all
employers and the union consent. Even where the new contractor has
agreements with employees who work on the capital of the same
primary employer, there is no reason to combine bargaining units
unless dictated by traditional accretion, community-of-interest considerations such as the new contractor's managerial system or its interchange of employees.
In my view, this reformulation of successorship law should also
apply to cases involving the sale of capital assets to new primary employers, in addition to the transfer of employee management contracts.
13 2 ff the new contractor has no more legal authority than the old to change terms and
conditions of employment, the employees would seem to have no more interest in the identity
of this contractor than they would in the identity of their supervisors and the firm's managers.
Cf 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (B) (labor organization cannot coerce employer "in the selection of his
representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances").
13 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Striking and picketing in support of collective
bargaining of course remain protected from employer retaliation, notwithstanding the employer's
right to maintain operations with permanent replacements. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
1345 See 406 U.S. at 275.
13 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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An asset sale might be viewed as a withdrawal of capital justifying the
dissolution of the collective bargaining relationship. Assets can be sold,
however, at a price that expresses the buyer's judgment of the present
value of the future returns of the assets. The sale of assets does not
establish that a capital investment in those assets cannot offer sufficient
returns at the wage rate sought by the workers who help make these
assets productive. Therefore, allowing a provider of capital to escape
the claims of collective bargaining on its assets by their sale to another
provider of capital would also fracture the basic compromise in the
NLRA. Current successorship law provides investors an incentive to
achieve higher value for their capital by selling the assets in which it is
invested to other investors who could be free of a collective bargaining
relationship, regardless of whether the new investors could otherwise
136
provide more efficient management of those assets.
This incentive would be eliminated if an asset sale did not dissolve
the collective bargaining relationship. Like a new employee management contractor, a new owner of the assets that continued to combine
37
those assets with labor in the same manner as the previous owner
would be required to offer continued employment to members of any
bargaining unit attached to those assets under the same terms and
conditions offered by the prior owner. It would also be required to
continue those terms until after the expiration of any extant collective
bargaining agreement and after bargaining in good faith to impasse
on any proposed new terms. These requirements also need not conflict
with any principle against the imposition of contract terms once it is
recognized that the collective bargaining relationship attaches to particular capital assets and to the way these assets are made productive,
rather than to particular, personalized owners of the capital.
The reformulated successorship doctrine advanced here expresses
its own limits. A new contractor should have no duty to bargain with
136 The law governing asset sales follows the law made in Burns for contract transfers. See
generally
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
137 See id. Under current law the Board will find that a purchaser of assets is a successor
employer with a duty to bargain (though not to observe the terms of an unexpired collective

agreement) when the purchaser not only hires a majority of its employees from the seller's work
force, but also maintains a "substantial continuity" between the enterprises. See id. at 43. The
"substantial continuity" test should focus the Board's attention on whether the new owner

attempts to make the assets productive through the use of labor in the same manner. See id. Some
of the factors that the Board considers under this test, such as "whether the employees of the
new company are doing the same jobs in the same working conditions" and "whether the new
entity has the same production process," seem to have this focus. See id. Other factors that the
Board considers, however, such as whether the new entity has the "same supervisors" and the
"same body of customers," seem to blur the analysis. See id.
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a union representing employees of a prior contractor who produced
the same service or good produced by the new contractor, but with different capital assets. For instance, an automobile manufacturer could
shift its contracts for the production of batteries for its cars from one
independent battery manufacturer to another, without the second
manufacturer having to hire the first's employees and without having
to fulfill the first's collective bargaining obligations.
This would be true even if the ultimate reason for the automobile
manufacturer's transfer of production contracts was the high labor
costs generated by collective bargaining at the first battery manufacturer's operations. This reflects the Act's basic compromise; the inability of the first battery manufacturer to continue sufficiently low cost
and high quality production indicates that the first manufacturer could
not continue to allocate capital to this production at the returns made
available with the higher labor costs. The ability of the employees at
the first manufacturer to obtain higher wages from returns generated
by the capital they make productive is limited by the discretion of the
providers of the capital to insist on sufficiently high returns for that
capital to continue its allocation to the production in which the employees are engaged. The automobile manufacturer's transfer of production contracts operates as a forced withdrawal of the first battery
manufacturer's capital from the production of its batteries.
Thus, the reach of this newly formulated successorship law should
turn on whether the primary capital made productive by the prior
bargaining unit has been transferred or rather withdrawn and transformed to a different use. Since this test tracks the test for a joint
employment bargaining relationship, the same questions about the
primary source of capital must be answered. For example, a trucking
company whose drivers regularly deliver a number of shippers' goods
through use of the trucking company's own fleet of trucks and warehouse system is the primary provider of capital that makes these employees productive, and is the sole employer of these employees, rather
than only a joint employer with the shippers. 138 Thus, the trucking
company would not be required to assume the collective bargaining
obligations of any prior deliverer of any shipper's products. On the
other hand, a newspaper delivery contractor that does not invest in its
own delivery vehicles or in an inventory of newspapers primarily only
supervises and manages workers who make productive the capital
invested in the production and the marketing of the newspapers deliv-
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See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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ered. A transfer of a delivery contract to such a company, therefore,
normally also should transfer the prior contractor's collective bargaining obligations as ajoint employer along with the newspaper publisher.
The doctrines governing employee, joint employer and successorship
status can and should be made consistent.
V.

CONCLUSION

As acknowledged in the introduction, the doctrinal proposals advanced here would not appeal to the current Congress. They would
have to be presented to a very different legislature in a quite different
political climate. But those who believe in collective bargaining in a
capitalist economy, and who believe in the structure and goals for such
bargaining set by the original National Labor Relations Act, still may
ponder fruitfully the legal regime that could more fully implement that
structure and achieve those goals. In my view, it is the special responsibility of legal academics to craft doctrine that effectively could achieve
alternative social visions. Although we have no comparative advantage
in selecting among such visions, we can be guided by ones that once
set social agendas and that may do so again in response to shifting
political winds.

